Did the US withdrawal from Afghanistan help ISIS regroup?
A permissive environment enabled ISIS-K to plan attacks beyond its borders
Last week's terrorist attack on a concert hall in Moscow, one of the deadliest in Russia in decades, has once again focused attention on the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), ISIS's branch in Central Asia, which immediately claimed responsibility. The ISIS affiliate group operates primarily in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, although it seeks to establish a caliphate throughout the historical "Khorasan"—a region that includes parts of the modern-day nations of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.
The rise of the Islamic State in 2014 amidst the turmoil of Iraq and Syria, a situation fueled by Vladimir Putin's unwavering support for Bashar al-Assad's regime, was a spectacle to behold. Fast forward to recent times, and the group seemed to be fading into the shadows due to successful counterinsurgency efforts worldwide, led by the United States.
Disaffected members of the Taliban loyal to ISIS's more violent strain of Islam founded ISIS-K in 2015. The group lost about half of its fighters in NATO and Afghan attacks, but the Taliban's rise provided ISIS-K with fresh opportunities to wreak havoc.
The recent attack in Russia is just one glaring example of their newfound vigor. Coincidentally, on the same day, a devastating ISIS-K suicide bombing in Kandahar claimed the lives of at least 21 individuals, showcasing the group's expanding reach and deadly efficiency.
In January, ISIS-K orchestrated a devastating pair of attacks in Iran, killing more than 100 people during a memorial service for Qassem Soleimani, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps' Quds Force commander killed by the US. The US warned Iran at the time of what it believed to be an impending terrorist attack, as it did recently with Russia.
A day before the Moscow attack, U.S. Central Command chief General Michael Kurilla told lawmakers that "ISIS-Khorasan retains the capability and the will to attack U.S. and Western interests abroad in as little as six months with little to no warning." Weeks earlier, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow had urged U.S. citizens to avoid crowded events, "to include concerts."
There is no shortage of international reports and assessments repeatedly highlighting the region's burgeoning terrorist landscape, with ISIS-K posing the most imminent threat. The United Nations Security Council's monitoring report earlier this year painted a vivid picture of a "high concentration of terrorist groups" in Afghanistan, with the group taking the spotlight as the primary concern.
The Director of National Intelligence's recent report on global threats outlines how ISIS-K's ambitions extend far beyond localized attacks, aiming to establish a foothold in Central Asia to enhance its global reach.
We saw this coming. A year ago, Christine Abizaid, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, told Congress that ISIS-K was the "threat actor I am most concerned about. We see concerning indications of ISIS-Khorasan in Afghanistan and its ambition that might go beyond that immediate territory."
“ISIS-K may be a rival of the Taliban, but ISIS-K benefitted from the Taliban’s takeover, and also the US withdrawal,” says Michael Kugelman, director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center.
Kuggelman notes that the end of NATO airstrikes, which were effective in managing the ISIS threat, gave the group breathing room in the absence of Taliban airpower.
“In effect, ISIS-K has benefited from an enabling environment in Afghanistan, emboldening it to expand its focus far beyond its bastion areas,” he says.
One would think that the Taliban's iron-fisted rule, especially their brutal treatment of Afghan women, would deter such insurgencies from flourishing. Yet, even though ISIS-K considers itself as a rival of Taliban - which it believes failed to implement true Shariah law since seizing power in 2021 - the Taliban have indirectly fueled ISKP's resurgence.
The Taliban's claims to be staunch opponents of global terrorism while struggling to rein in terrorist factions within their borders—are both laughable and alarming.
The Doha agreement, hailed as a potential solution to both, has proven itself to be the farce we all expected it would become. The Taliban, desperate for international legitimacy, proudly brandish their supposed success in maintaining Afghan soil as a terrorist-free zone while turning a blind eye to fighters moving between Afghanistan and tribal areas of Pakistan.
Let’s not not forget the Taliban's initial gracious act of releasing thousands of criminals, including ISKP militants, from Afghan prisons. It was a move so generous that it gifted ISIS-K with the manpower to orchestrate deadly attacks, including the heart-wrenching attack at Kabul airport that claimed the lives of innocent Afghans and U.S. service members. One of the masterminds of ISIS-K attacks on Iran in January was one of those prisoners released by the Taliban.
A number of extremist groups have been able to regroup, mobilize fighters, and recruit new members since the US departure. Several fighters from the Taliban's and TTP's own ranks have identified with the Islamic State's more fundamentalist ideology and joined ISIS-K. Many of them now operate out of Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas, where they enjoy safe haven.
While there is sharp debate over the extent to which al-Qaeda has been able to reconstitute, the ability of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters to shuttle between Afghanistan and Pakistan to launch attacks suggests that the Taliban government has been at best slow to act. Pakistan recently launched airstrikes—or what it called "intelligence-based anti-terrorist operations"—on alleged militant hideouts inside Afghan territory, heightening tensions between the two countries.
Since the American withdrawal, the Taliban's selective approach to terrorism, has turned Afghanistan into a breeding ground for ideological sympathizers and opportunistic alliances since the American withdrawal.
The evolving relationship between the Taliban and Tehran has also concerned US officials. While there are indications of potential collaboration against ISIS-K, increased Iranian involvement in Afghanistan, including the deployment of proxy militant forces, could escalate tensions and exacerbate existing security challenges in the region. This scenario could lead to renewed cycles of violence and instability, not only in Afghanistan but also in neighboring countries like Pakistan.
Against this backdrop, the United States faces critical questions regarding its approach to countering terrorism following its complete military withdrawal from Afghanistan. The concept of "over the horizon" operations, championed by President Biden and US military officials, was touted as a strategy to address security threats without a physical military presence on the ground.
The success in dismantling the Islamic State's caliphate in Iraq and Syria relied on a combination of precise intelligence, air support, and ground operations led by supportive local forces. However, replicating this model in Afghanistan post-withdrawal hasn’t proven to be as successful. ISIS-K has had it so much easier than ISIS ever had in Syria and Iraq.
“After two decades of the global war on terror, groups have become more adaptable,” says American University’s Sara Harmouch. “This is not a resurgence; it’s persistence. The visibility or decline of attacks does not insinuate defeat. An attack like this refocuses the global attention on the Islamic State, which is exactly what the group wants.”
The growth of ISIS-K also proves you can’t play whack-a-mole to defeat an ideology. The group may currently be the Islamic State’s most potent affiliate, but Harmouch says attacking the group would just be putting a band-aid on a problem that doesn’t have a military solution.
“If all our efforts over the past 20 plus years have taught us anything, it’s that we can't defeat an idea.” she says. “We can't defeat a history of grievances and anti-US sentiment. That means you cannot defeat a group. We need a different strategy.”
LOOSE CHANGE
There is so much more to unpack about the tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the proliferation of extremism in the region. This will be the subject of a future piece.
The attack in Moscow appears to be a relevance, recruiting and funding operation. Within the immediate neighbourhood of Afghanistan, no one outside of those countries cares one iota what happens. There's always a fanatical group willing to slaughter the innocents in the name of one thing or another.
By going to Moscow, they make an impact without arousing American anger. That's smart thinking. Their actions have exposed the security forces as being impotent despite getting a two week heads up from the Americans. The fact that the Russians chose to ignore the warnings like the Iranians makes Putin look bad. It creates a security dilemma for Russia where there's no good answer.
To compound the Russian misery, ISIS-K is not done with Russia yet. There's plenty of fertile ground in Chechnya, Ingleshetia, and Dhargestan for them to explore. At best this will be a case of schadenfreude as the West looks on to the unraveling of Russian security.
First Iran, then Moscow; how far will ISIS-K reach in their next attack? And what can be done to stop it? Apparently over the horizon means out of reach in Afghanistan. So thank you for reminding us of that once much touted strategy, and the ways in which the tragic withdrawn from Afghanistan eliminated any possibility of the strategy having any success in the region.
But this article also made me realize the lingering benefits of the twenty years there, despite the disastrous decision to leave. The contacts the United States military likely still maintains, were almost certainly what allowed them to detect the looming attacks in Iran and Moscow – and with such specificity. I’m no expert, but to an outside observer that kind of intel seems extraordinary. So for once military intelligence was not an oxymoron. It’s just too bad there is now no way to act upon that kind of intelligence in any truly effective way in Afghanistan.